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Abstract
Civil society organizations and grassroots groups are often unable to play an active role in post-
conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. A possible explanation for the observed challenges in 
peacebuilding is the gap or decoupling between international expectations and norms from practical 
action, local norms and capacities. External actors are often overly instrumental and operate 
according to a general template that fails to start from what the local capacities might actually be. 
This often leads to the decoupling of general values from practical action, which helps account 
for the observed barriers of engaging local civil and community organizations in reconstruction. 
We examine the different types of decoupling and the challenges these present. We evaluate 
our general theoretical argument using evidence based on the experiences of Liberian women’s 
civil society organizations. Given the compliance of the Liberian government with international 
norms, we should expect external actors to have an easier task in incorporating civil society and 
women’s organizations in the post-conflict reconstruction process; yet, the record appears to 
be the opposite. While we present the ‘tragic’ aspect of this relationship between international 
norms and local practice, we also suggest opportunities for ‘hybrid’ alternatives.
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Civil society organizations (CSOs) and grassroots groups are often unable to play an 
active role in reconstruction and development in post-conflict countries. Decoupling – 
defined as the gap between international norms and local norms and the capacity to 
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implement policies – provides a possible explanation for the observed challenges in 
peacebuilding and reconstruction. Decoupling occurs through different pathways, either 
because locals are unwilling to accept the new rules and norms or because they lack 
capacity to implement policies.
The literature on peacebuilding normally attributes failures in post-conflict recon-
struction to the top-down imposition of policies and values on local populations (see 
Paris and Sisk, 2009; Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2014). Another impediment to post-
conflict reconstruction is the difficulty of formulating bottom-up policies when local 
actors have low capacity (Donais, 2012; Pouligny, 2006). This overlooks how local 
community organizations and civil society – despite the many challenges – are often 
eager participants in the reconstruction process and willing to adopt institutional 
reforms conforming to international norms and practices (Donais, 2012; Interviews in 
Liberia, 2011).
Our claim here is not that arguments about weak civil society and top-down inter-
vention are inherently wrong, but rather that they fail to distinguish situations where 
locals are unwilling to accept international norms and values with cases where locals 
are willing but unable to implement policies due to low capacity. Both lack of willing-
ness and capacity appear to lead to similar outcomes (e.g. failure to implement poli-
cies) and decoupling, but these are different obstacles to peacebuilding with distinct 
causes and challenges. Decoupling provides a more nuanced approach to understand-
ing interactions between external and domestic actors and encompasses both scenarios 
as obstacles that hinder the process of peacebuilding.
External influences on post-conflict states are not limited to direct external coercion 
or imposition through international intervention, but also take mimetic (i.e. imitating) 
and normative forms. In fact, newly emerged states and societies may come to display 
similar institutions or outcomes through a process of isomorphism, or adaptation to 
softer international norms and expectations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Convergence 
of institutions often leads to the decoupling of general values from practical action, 
which creates barriers to properly engage local civil and community organizations in 
reconstruction. As we will explore in detail, decoupling comes in different types, and 
each category of decoupling leads to different challenges for external and local actors. 
Recognizing decoupling can help in contextualizing the implementation of peacebuild-
ing policies and also in identifying the mechanisms behind this.
We evaluate our general theoretical argument by exploring the experiences of Liberian 
women’s CSOs since the end of the civil war in 2003. Liberia is an appropriate case study, 
because of the important role of local female leaders in the peacemaking process leading 
up to the women’s organizations’ mediating presence in the Peace Agreement signed in 
2003, and the election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf as President in 2005 and 2011. Moreover, 
following United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325, Liberia became the 
first country in Africa, together with the Ivory Coast, to adopt a National Action Plan 
(NAP) for implementing UNSCR 1325 in 2009. Liberia appears to perform quite well on 
certain indicators of gender empowerment considering the level of development in the 
country and the recent conflict history (Gizelis, 2009; Kevane, 2004; Svensson, 2008). In 
the Liberian context policies illuminate the tension between the pursuit of global values 
resulting from international interactions and the reality present at the local level.
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We set out our argument first by looking at debates about local and external actors in 
the peacebuilding process, then by discussing the idea of decoupling and differentiating 
three aspects of this, then by applying this to Liberia. Our conclusions highlight the gaps 
that have been revealed, and also point to some possible opportunities to overcome these.
Interactions between external and local actors
In a post-conflict environment external actors can interact with locals in two ways. One 
the one hand, bottom-up approaches emphasize the importance of local non-governmen-
tal and grassroots organizations in reconstruction (Lederach, 2008). Top-down peace-
building approaches, on the other hand, tend to focus on elites and establishing functioning 
institutions in a country after violent conflict (Donais, 2012; Paris, 1997).
Influential sources, such as the Annan (2005) report, develop the idea that the UN 
system requires a greater focus on governance through promoting partnerships and local 
ownership. This approach to peacebuilding seeks to strengthen individual, local and 
national capacities, building institutions, instigating good governance and enhancing 
economic opportunities. The report follows a ‘people-centred’ approach, placing local 
populations at the centre of the strategy and empowering them to take the initiative 
(Annan, 2005: 2). ‘People-centred’ or bottom-up approaches emphasize the importance 
of local dialogue and capacity building, and appeal to local actors. However, they do so 
through an international template that is overly technical, depoliticizing and often exclu-
sionary (Paris, 2002). The focus is often on a handful of professional non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) that are often artificial creations, with weak roots in the commu-
nity, and dependent on external support (Ottaway, 2000: 85). More deep-rooted and 
active local groups tend to stay out of such activities and their neglect is a consequence 
of internationally set priorities. International bodies, such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), World Bank and development agencies, believe the main focus for peace-
building should be to get institutions to comply with a set of political and economic 
standards and expectations (Boutros-Ghali, 1992; World Bank, 1997, 2002). Duffield 
(2002) has labelled this a process of ‘metropolitan monitoring’.
Critics argue that liberal peace is externally driven and imposes a particular under-
standing of peacebuilding favoured by dominant states and international organizations. 
Most international organizations internalize the political and economic values of the 
wealthy liberal democracies, while countries hosting peacebuilding missions tend to be 
poor and politically weak (Paris, 2002). Although Paris (2002: 638) is supportive of lib-
eralization, he recognizes that this cannot be imposed, and goes so far as to suggest that 
the attempts to apply standards for domestic governance makes contemporary peace-
keeping resemble the colonial era’s ‘mission civilisatrice’.
Recently, a number of approaches have emerged that highlight the limits of the liberal 
peace approach (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013). Chief among these is the hybridity 
approach, which suggests a tense, conflictual and ultimately accommodating process of 
peace configurations worked out across a range of different actors, contexts and norma-
tive frameworks (Richmond, 2015: 62). There is an emphasis on intersubjective media-
tion between local and international scales and norms with conflict mitigated through 
everyday life (51). Richmond emphasizes the central dilemmas of hybridity in 
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the configuration of relationships and compromises between different actors and their 
socio-historical, normative and interest frameworks (Richmond, 2015: 62). The strength 
of this approach lies with its highlighting of different scales, agents and the tensions 
between them. Björkdahl and Höglund (2013), although sympathetic to the hybridity 
approach as well as related ideas like localization, argue that the literature has not suffi-
ciently emphasized empowerment and disempowerment and that it undertheorizes local 
agency. Other arguments emphasize friction and the unexpected outcomes of interaction 
(Millar et al., 2013: 142).
While not disagreeing with these arguments, we wish to highlight something slightly 
different, namely processes and mechanisms by which such tensions or frictions, com-
promises and accommodations are produced and managed. With the hybridity approach 
it is easy to lose track of specific mechanisms, given the emphasis on constantly chang-
ing complexes or amalgamations (Mac Ginty, 2010: 404). The friction approach does 
talk about generative processes, but again emphasizes the unexpected (Millar et al., 
2013: 142). We do not disagree with this, but believe that focusing on decoupling can 
help illuminate some of the key mechanisms behind these processes and how the out-
comes are perhaps more unintended rather than unexpected.
Distinguishing different processes is helped by Millar’s (2014) attempt to disaggre-
gate hybridity theory by outlining hybridity at four levels – institutional, practical, ritual 
and conceptual. Our analysis starts at the institutional level, because we agree that insti-
tutional hybridity is most open to international agency and most amenable to planning 
and administration. As Millar (2014: 505) suggests, institutions are the main sites where 
we find the effects of political influence, technical knowledge and access to economic 
and human capital. In contrast to bottom-up arguments, we use decoupling to get at this 
wider institutional setting within which actors are embedded, specifically at the global 
level where mimicry can be more influential than persuasion and habituation (Mushkat, 
2009: 438). Understood globally, acculturation and norm diffusion can be considered as 
distinct social mechanisms that influence state behaviour, generating similarity of behav-
iour across many issue areas (Goodman and Jinks, 2008: 726). Decoupling allows for the 
identification of mechanisms and structural processes that may generate both conflict 
and similarity, and indeed provide mechanisms to facilitate compliance.
Post-conflict states often seek to establish reconstruction practices consistent with 
specific values, organizational structures and approaches deemed appropriate by external 
actors. Specific forms of institutions and efforts to build local state capacity and mini-
mize the relapse of conflict may be adopted as a result of direct coercion and persuasion 
by external actors (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000). However, this may also come about 
because post-conflict states seek to adapt ‘liberal’ or ‘modern’ practices due to accultura-
tion and imitation of ‘relevant’ state structures (Goodman and Jinks, 2008: 728). Civil 
society is not necessarily co-opted or made up of passive consumers of externally 
imposed values and ideas, but may actively participate and willingly conform and adapt 
to global norms and values (Finnemore, 1996: 343; Goodman and Jinks, 2004; Meyer 
et al., 1997: 165).
We set out in the next section how the global diffusion of values also leads to decou-
pling, which is the process of creating and maintaining gaps between formal policies and 
actual practices on the ground. This gets at many of the issues raised in the hybridity 
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literature, but maintains a connection with the structural dynamics and norm diffusion 
that help contextualize the behaviour of agents and entities. The structural pressure to 
adapt to global values, ideas and principles creates a range of inconsistencies that often 
lead to incoherent policy outcomes. Post-conflict countries and societies adopt values 
from a world that offers many examples of variant models and options. Thus, conver-
gence to global values and principles is not uniform or consistent (Meyer et al., 1997; 
Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Strang and Meyer, 1993).
Decoupling in peacebuilding
The idea of decoupling has been extensively applied to the study of human rights, where 
adherence to international laws and treaties does not translate into transformative changes 
in local practices (Cole, 2005; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005; Hafner-Burton et al., 
2008; Koenig, 2008). Goodman and Jinks (2008) highlight three different archetypes of 
decoupling that usually emerge in human rights implementation. The first category of 
decoupling (technical decoupling) transpires when the global norms are not properly 
configured to the local technical needs. Even though this is a fairly common form of 
decoupling, it does not constitute a lack of compliance with international norms, unlike 
the other two forms of decoupling that we explore more extensively in this article. On the 
contrary, changes in bureaucratic structures and adoption of new legal frameworks pro-
gressively lead to decoupling and the transformation of state institutions (Goodman and 
Jinks, 2008: 730). The second category of decoupling (normative decoupling) represents 
the lack of willingness to comply with externally imposed values and norms. In this case, 
decoupling includes cases where there is public compliance to global values and prac-
tices, but it is disconnected by local practices, values and behavioural expectations (e.g. 
human rights violation, lack of implementation of gender mainstreaming policies, imple-
mentation of institutional reforms or effective taxation). Finally, the third category of 
decoupling (resource decoupling) is a gap between embracing new policies and the local 
capacity to implement and monitor the adopted policies. In this scenario, locals are will-
ing to implement policies and adjust to international norms, but they do not have the 
capacity to do so effectively.
While not initially applied to the reconstruction of states, decoupling is present in 
post-conflict contexts when states and societies are going through a transformation in 
order to minimize the chances of recurring conflict. Not all the forms of decoupling are 
evidence of major failures in the process of adopting new values and reform state struc-
tures. Some forms of decoupling might even be necessary. Often, ‘benign’ forms of tech-
nical decoupling – such as the outcome of restructuring bureaucracies – can be intertwined 
with more complicated gaps in practice (Goodman and Jinks, 2004).
The normative decoupling constitutes a more severe challenge to deep institutional 
reform (Goodman and Jinks, 2008). In this case there is a gap between the global 
script of behavioural patterns, expectations and institutional design and local prac-
tices. In the case of peacebuilding, it covers a wide range of policy areas and topics. 
Human rights violations caused by adherence to local practices are a common exam-
ple of such a gap. The mismatch between the restructuring of formal state institutions 
and the prevailing forms and structures of local social networks and CSOs leads to 
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perverse outcomes, such as lack of cooperation between external actors and local 
CSOs, mistrust and divergent goals.
The third form of decoupling – resource decoupling – commonly reflects the diffi-
culty of peacebuilding policies to configure the new institutions to the local populations’ 
needs. As noted by the liberal peace critics, the templates applied usually fail to start 
from the existing local capacities and expertise, as we are going to illustrate. This form 
of decoupling leads to failure in engaging with local grassroots activists because of their 
own low capacity or misperception on how local social networks can be incorporated in 
the peacebuilding process. Identifying the type of decoupling that persists during the 
peacebuilding process can contribute to the differentiation of policies and to addressing 
specific challenges, some more problematic than others.
Implementing peacebuilding and governance in Liberia
Liberia’s 2006 National Human Development Report (NHDR) and NAP are clear exam-
ples of attempts to convergence towards international norms and expectations that can 
lead to decoupling. Pitched in very general terms that reflect the global norms that each 
country should adhere to, the NHDR (UNDP Liberia & Liberia Ministry of Planning and 
Economic Affairs, 2006: 17) focuses on good governance and social capacity building 
linked to a vibrant and responsible civil society.
The development of NAPs to implement the Women, Peace, and Security agenda, as 
has been outlined in Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325), is an example of 
efforts to engage with local actors and CSOs as stakeholders in the process. The main 
goals of the LNAP are to strengthen and develop prevention, response and protection 
policies, procedures and mechanisms that promote human rights and guarantee the secu-
rity of women and girls, to promote their empowerment through a range of economic, 
social and security policies, and to raise awareness of Resolution 1325 as a means of 
strengthening and coordinating gender mainstreaming activities (Ministry of Gender of 
Development, 2009: 12).
The process of drafting the plan – developed by the Ministry of Gender with the help of 
the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the UN International Research and Training Institute 
for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW) – began in August 2008 and the plan was offi-
cially launched on 8 March 2009. The participants in the consultative process included repre-
sentatives of various governmental institutions, UN agencies, representatives of donors, 
CSOs, community-based NGOs and leading women’s CSOs, such as the Women NGO’s 
Secretariat of Liberia (WONGOSOL). It was validated by participants at strategic regional 
county dialogues, discussed with a number of key stakeholders and developed through the 
1325 National Steering Committee and at an Indicators Workshop organized by the Ministry 
of Gender and Development and supported by the UN Fund for Women (Ministry of Gender 
of Development, 2009:  8).
There is scope within this framework for bottom-up policies and initiatives that target 
local actors. The UN is very clear that grassroots organizations should be the main tar-
gets with support for enhancing their capacity to advocate for gender equality 
(Government of Liberia and the United Nations, 2009: 22). Yet, norm diffusion reflects 
the power distribution within the system of global governance and the unequal relation-
ship between the advocates of certain norms, values and expectations and those deemed 
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to be the ‘recipients’. There are two aspects to this process – a more structural process of 
acculturation and a more intersubjective diffusion of norms, understood by Autesserre 
(2014: 38) as the trained mindset of the intervenor and the privileging of ‘expert’ knowl-
edge over local understandings.
The role of CSOs is to act as watchdogs and civil society, notably women’s groups, is 
called upon to monitor the implementation of LNAP and the UNSCR 1325. Neither these 
interventions nor methods of monitoring their implementation are driven by local capaci-
ties and needs. The process of norm diffusion takes little account of context or of potential 
for hybrid solutions. Although post-conflict countries and societies may seek to actively 
engage in the process, they lack the technical capacity to implement and monitor the pre-
scribed policies themselves or the willingness to do it. As a result, the lack of competence 
or compliance leads to either resource or normative decoupling – or both – which under-
mines the implementation of programmes such as NAP and gender mainstreaming.
Liberia’s experience: Decoupling and gaps in 
implementation
We further illustrate both normative and resource decoupling by examining the interac-
tions of Liberian women’s CSOs with external actors, such as the UNMIL and foreign 
NGOs, and the challenges that local CSOs face while adopting and implementing global 
values and practices.
The empirical evidence is based on semi-structured interviews conducted in Liberia 
in April and June 2011. The research focused on the interactions between women’s CSOs 
and the UN mission. The questions explored the history of the organizations, their expe-
riences of interacting with external actors, their level of engagement with peacebuilding 
and reconstruction, and their overall assessment of the challenges they were facing. 
Twenty-eight out of a total of 42 interviews included local CSOs, mostly led by women. 
The CSOs were located in Monrovia and the counties of Lofa, Nimba and River Cess. 
The counties were selected based on the level of UN presence – measured by the number 
of UN contingencies – and indicators of female empowerment, such as relative education 
ratio, that reflect the social and economic characteristics of each county (for which we 
generally do not have more direct data).
The selection criteria ensured variation in terms of women’s capacity to mobilize and 
the presence of external actors. The sample of the selected women’s organizations was 
not random, but there was enough variation to represent different circumstances and 
experiences. The three counties outside Monrovia – where most of the interviews took 
place – also exhibited significant variation in social and economic development. Outside 
Monrovia, Nimba county is the most populated county, with a strong UN and interna-
tional NGO presence. Women have a relatively high education ratio compared to men 
and a culture of traditional social organization (Gizelis, 2011). River Cess is the polar 
opposite, a very isolated area with a dispersed population and low capacity to organize. 
At the time of the interviews (2011) there was one UNMIL camp to serve the whole 
county and no other international actors present.
Out of the 28 organizations, 25 were organized and led by women. In 24 out of the 25 
organizations, all the spokespersons were women, whereas in one of them a man and a 
woman represented the organization. The number of spokespersons varied depending on 
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the location –whether the meeting took place at their centre or offices or in other locations 
– and the overall strength of the organization. In general, older and high in capacity organ-
izations had their own centres for meetings and more representatives were present during 
the interviews. Their numbers varied from five to one. The purpose of these organizations 
also varied from engaging with peacebuilding as a process, instigating policies on specific 
issue areas, such as sexual violence and agricultural projects, and monitoring the imple-
mentation of the principles and goals of the LNAP. The organizations included in the 
sample were both influential and historical organizations located in Monrovia, such as 
WONGOSOL, and rural organizations in the three counties outside Monrovia.
In addition to the women’s organizations, the interviews included government officials 
from the Ministry of Gender and Development, UN officials from Monrovia, Bong, River 
Cess, Lofa and Nimba counties, and three of the major international NGOs present in 
Liberia at the time. Background information and commentaries were also provided by 
other local NGOs located in Monrovia, but with an extensive network of activities in rural 
parts of the country, as well as other grassroots organizations involved in peacebuilding.
The second area where decoupling, especially normative decoupling, is observed 
includes differences in policy priorities. These differences reflect deeper values about 
local practices and traditions engrained in the role those social networks and CSOs play 
in local societies. Both these areas impact the ability of most grassroots organizations to 
engage with the global norms and values.
Resource decoupling: Public compliance versus local capacity
During the interviews with women’s organizations and external actors, two themes 
emerged that suggest decoupling. The structure and characteristics of what constitutes a 
CSO and social network in a post-conflict environment do not converge with interna-
tional expectations. The interviews indicate that the weak or loose structures of local 
CSOs lead to low capacity; thus, in these cases decoupling occurs because of grassroots 
organizations’ inability to implement policies. In some cases external actors often do not 
recognize existing CSOs as legitimate partners in attracting donor funding, coordinating 
available resources to implement projects and policy formulation. In these instances nor-
mative decoupling occurs because of a lack of willingness by the locals to follow struc-
tures imposed by external actors, as well as of lack of capacity. Although the analytical 
distinction is important, it is not always easy to separate the two different types of decou-
pling – resources and normative. The following comment by a UN official regarding the 
overall impact and state of Liberian CSOs reflects the perceptions of many international 
NGOs and UN officials of what constitutes a CSO in Liberia:
That I’ve noticed in my work, sort of out in the field is that like it’s hard to connect to civil 
society in general of any kind, like it’s, it’s pretty diffused and there aren’t sort of like very sort 
of like. It hasn’t appeared to me in a year and a half that there are very many sort of cohesive 
grass roots organizations. (UNMIL official)
Most CSOs do not have formal membership or registers, and volunteers rather than 
two to three salaried staff perform most administrative tasks. While there are cases where 
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representatives report membership numbers up to 2000, it is not clear how realistic and 
accurate such numbers are because there are no registers, just loose associations. 
Moreover, most of the CSOs do not have an explicit organizational structure. Most com-
munity organizations have a leader – often self-appointed – who represents the members, 
but it is unclear if the leader has a mandate or to what extent the appointed leader accu-
rately and faithfully represents the opinions, wishes and needs of the other members of 
the group. As another UNMIL official points out:
…but there’s the sort of elite of Liberian local civil society and then below that just pretty loose 
associations. So when you… what I found when we get down to the village level there is often 
not really an obvious youth group or an obvious women’s group to sort of engage with, but 
there will be sort of a leaders that sort of bring women or youth together. (UNMIL official 2011)
The informal nature of social networks and loose associations among different com-
munities makes it difficult to measure their effectiveness using concrete indicators and 
criteria. In the absence of any clear measurements on the extent and resilience of such 
loose associations and networks, it is difficult for external actors to appreciate their exist-
ence, actively engage with them in implementing post-conflict programmes and projects, 
and evaluate their performance. As a UNMIL official clearly indicates, the loose struc-
ture of Liberian CSOs presents a challenge to efforts to build bridges with the CSOs and 
use them as partners in the implementation of policies:
You cannot do business with that kind of NGOs so we have to know where they are located how 
they are located, what are the facilities they have, what kind of resources they have, although it 
is true that they would need capacity building if resources are not adequate you don’t have to 
take the risk you have to go to somebody who has at least 75% to 80% of the resources you are 
looking for. And then work with them and the process build their capacity to be able to get to 
the next level. So we do capacity assessment based on our own checklist (our emphasis). 
(UNMIL official 2011)
Ever worse, external actors cannot even identify existing organizations as such; thus, 
making the implementation of policy documents such as the LNAP quite difficult in 
practice. The following two quotes, the first one from a UNMIL officer and the second 
one by a member of a foreign NGO, highlight the challenges of identifying grassroots 
organizations as partners:
I don’t know for me I’m still skeptical about that rural women structure. To be honest on I have 
my doubts about their sincerity there. It’s the Ministry’s baby, it’s the ministry’ brain child. This 
from my own you know perspective these are women who are very active in politics so they 
made them County coordinators, now they have County structures they have even acting 
district structures they have. (Representative of NGO 2011)
But I think that in Nimba and Lofa we haven’t seen organizations as such, I mean there is always 
somebody who is representing women in the community and there is the county gender coordinator 
that sort of pull together a group of women or help identify candidates for trainings or for who in 
the course of their work referring women back to our teams. (Representative of NGO 2011)
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Ironically, by most accounts parts of Nimba and Lofa counties have some of the most 
vibrant CSOs outside Monrovia, as another interviewee points out: ‘You go to some 
counties you have a lot of NGOs based there, maybe because of the activities in those 
counties like Nimba for example there are many NGOs based in either Ganta or 
Sanniquellie’ (UNMIL official 2011).
In particular, in Nimba county there are currently organizations that predate the sec-
ond civil war and have had a track record of collaborating with UN agencies. Thus, the 
responses of external actors towards CSOs and women’s organizations suggest that 
decoupling transpires during peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction, at least 
with regards to the structures and resources available to the CSOs, rendering them unsuit-
able partners in implementing policies.
The LNAP emphasizes the role of CSOs in monitoring and assisting the implementa-
tion of the recommendations of the LNAP and UNSCR 1325. While the LNAP is a clear 
signal of compliance with international norms and goals by the government of Liberia, it 
is questionable whether the majority of women’s organizations have the capacity to per-
form some or all of the prescribed tasks. The incongruity between public compliance in 
the forms of instruments such as the LNAP and the lack of capacity in CSOs constitutes 
an illustrative example of decoupling.
International NGOs and UN agencies do not seem to have a very clear understanding 
of the actual capacity levels of these organizations within the social context where they 
function. As a UN official admitted, until 2011 there was no effort to assess the capacity 
of most of the women’s organizations, a situation that she was hoping would change with 
the arrival of the Swedish NGO Kvinna till Kvinna in Liberia.
One of the oldest and most revered women’s organizations in Nimba county still 
struggles to build enough capacity to sustain developmental projects. The organization 
also maintains a centre that provides child care and literacy programmes for women. 
Acquiring a new mill was necessary to increase their agricultural output so they can sup-
port and implement more activities in their community. Their experience with their new 
mill is indicative of the lack of resources and know-how that hinders capacity building. 
However, in their narrative there is also evidence of their willingness to work with exter-
nal actors:
We were given a project that is the cassava project and this project came about to add value on our 
cassava because we were only doing planting cassava you know harvested, carried on the market 
and sometimes to even make the carry it was so difficult. It was a brilliant idea to help the women 
to leave from another stage to a higher stage or in fact transforming that women’s organization 
into a business entity but unfortunately our anticipation of that project it did not work out the way 
we wanted it to be… At the same time he said it can produce 30 bags of cassava everyday so the 
very first time the women brought so many cassava about 65 to 70 bags and grinding, did 
everything but there was no press to drain the water and there were so many things so we felt that 
it was kind of a disappointment to us until now we have gone nowhere so we still need external 
support again maybe help us to graduate from that stage. (CSO in Nimba 2011)
Low organizational capacity hinders the efforts of most organizations to preserve 
viable agricultural projects that will be self-financed in the long term and obstructs wom-
en’s organizations from engaging with the Liberian political process and fulfilling their 
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expected roles. While at face value enhancing the capacity of CSOs is a common goal for 
the external actors and the government, the methods of supporting CSOs do not match 
the existing capacity and needs, thus leading to resource decoupling. The following 
quote summarizes the crucible of why most attempts to support CSOs fall short:
For now they don’t have the capacity, because all of their projects are small small projects, like 
they farm together the cassava farm, and sell their product and then they will use that thing to 
get some other seeds and replant. So they don’t have bigger projects actually to take care. 
(Local CSO in Lofa 2011)
Normative decoupling: Divergent goals and willingness to comply
The difficulties external actors have in directly engaging with CSOs are partly attributed 
to lack of trust in terms of the motivations that drive many of the rural organizations, as 
well as their links to the political elites. Traditional authorities and political elites often 
control the agendas of CSOs. Their objectives diverge from the policy goals of external 
actors or the policies espoused by the government, especially on issues such as human 
rights, leading to unwillingness to comply with norms or decoupling. In addition to nor-
mative gaps regarding the forms of social networks and CSOs in post-conflict countries, 
such as Liberia, inconsistencies in values and expectations in social behaviour between 
external actors and local populations also lead to decoupling and unwillingness to fully 
cooperate with external actors.
Normative decoupling is particularly evident in the area of women’s or human rights, 
as the following quote highlights:
If you start talking to people about women’s rights they begin to listen. Women’s rights human 
rights are so intertwined that people begin to listen and we tried to say yes these things are 
possible they are true. But then it is still an area where there are not familiar with so it’s difficult 
for them to internalize it. And it becomes a little bit, these people are coming with these terms 
which in the end will create problems for us in our communities. (Local CSO Lofa 2011)
The resistance to implementing women’s rights, especially in sexual violence and 
female genital mutilation (FGM), reflects an inherently negative response towards global 
values on gender mainstreaming and women’s rights, which are often perceived as 
threatening to local culture. Local communities perceive such rights as a foreign imposi-
tion that destroys traditional practices and customs and even undermines the role of more 
traditional associations, thus leading to resistance to global values, as a UNMIL official 
emphatically states:
For me traditional when you say traditional women’s groups it’s Sande society. Female genital 
mutilation is their human rights violation and although of course we understand that this is part 
of the culture in Liberia it has a long history. There is a very strong opposition among rural 
women especially to stop the practice. (UNMIL official 2011)
Representatives of local CSOs, however, suggest that sometimes unwillingness to 
comply with international norms comes from the government and the political elites or 
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even other local organizations and groups. The quote below also suggests that there are 
divisions among women’s organizations. While some organizations attempt to address 
issues of FGM and sexual violence, other organizations, like the traditional societies 
such as Sande, resist cooperation since many practices are part of their own traditions:
So sometimes maybe the government might not be so willing to work with us, for example 
issues concerning FGM, you know or you know bring into the Sande or poorer societies, so we 
do have our own like ladies, yeah they could be in women’s organizations you know however 
fluid those organizations are, whether they’re you know as in are they recognized by the 
government or not, but just some women’s organizations that are you know women coming 
together on specific issues. So we do we contact the women on our own, depending on what the 
issue is, depending on what we are trying to find out. You know, like I said issues of FGM and 
whether Sande school and bush schools are on it and what is happening. If there is anybody 
who is in trouble, maybe we need to assist etc. We might not be getting as much support from 
the government. (Local CSO Nimba 2011)
The diverging perceptions between grassroots organizations and external actors on 
human rights and values in general, and women’s rights in particular, often lead external 
actors to mistrust and ignore CSOs even in policy areas where it might have been pos-
sible to build consensus and develop synergies, such as adult education programmes.
If women’s organizations are not always engaged with topics such as human rights or 
sexual violence, what are the issues and policies that they are mostly interested in? 
Women’s organizations in the counties prioritize three main areas where they need sup-
port in order for their organizations to remain sustainable and able to flourish in the long 
term. None of these issues are a priority for donors or external actors, leading to norma-
tive decoupling when it comes to peacebuilding projects. The cost of transportation 
remains a serious obstacle for rural women’s organizations to reach members in remote 
areas. In most cases they have to walk long distances from village to village or set meet-
ings on market days, when most of the women gather to sell goods:
Being you know the spearhead of the women groups in Voinjama but again you know for 
example women it’s like the Voinjama district women for peace and democracy, this is Voinjama 
district (Interviewee shows on a map) they don’t even have a vehicle to be able to go to Kolahun 
or to like other places in Voinjama to contact with their women or to develop their network the 
only chance they have is if like someone would drive them or but these are like very basic 
things that prevent you to become an effective women’s group just on your district I think most 
of these women groups are very much localized. (Local CSO Lofa 2011)
The second priority of the women’s organizations is to build up their organizations’ 
capacity in order to remain sustainable even in the absence of external actors. 
Representatives of several organizations have consistently argued that externally funded 
projects, such as swamp cultivation of rice and cassava, are short term. Per the narrative 
of most of the organizations, they usually receive support such as agricultural tools or 
seeds, which eventually stops, before the groups have had the opportunity to become 
financially self-sufficient. Instead, they emphasize adult literacy training as essential for 
the ability of women’s organizations to write proposals and seek independent funding. 
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Moreover, as one of the women’s CSO representatives argues, literacy is necessary for 
women to be empowered to participate in peacebuilding and reconstruction. In other 
words, women suggest that for them adult education is imperative to address problems 
of decoupling due to low capacity:
Like I said challenges are various but for us our own setting will be to establish schools adult 
schools for women since we want to, we feel that women can also make it like for me I have a 
woman and what if she’s not educated. So UN need to do more so that by the time they leave 
you know women can be empowered completely to help themselves. (Local CSO 2011)
The lack of skills in writing proposals disenfranchises most women’s organizations 
from accessing resources and ultimately performing their role as ‘watchdogs’ of the 
implementation of global norms. While women’s organizations have indicated that there 
are a few attempts to provide them with basic skills and literacy, they also pointed out 
that often such projects are done in a haphazard way and with a lack sufficient funding 
so they are not sustainable. This lack of technical skills undermines the capacity building 
process of CSOs, as the following quote clearly articulates:
One of the reasons is we don’t know how to write proposals they are helping us because they 
are catering to women and children men and all of us welfare. We have not gotten any support 
from international or national donors because we don’t know how to write a proposal they 
come and interviewer us. We fill in we fill in the forms… we have not gotten any projects that 
will empower us as women. (Local CSO Nimba 2011)
However, empowerment is more than just writing proposals. Many women do not 
have the leadership skills or willingness to articulate their own interests, especially in 
front of men. The unwillingness of women to be present at the same time as men in gath-
erings reflects deeply rooted customs and beliefs that inevitable hinder the inclusive 
implementation of peacebuilding:
They don’t usually want to be there at the same time as the men, sort of, so even if they’re there 
they don’t really necessarily say anything, so maybe there is a need to sort of separate them, 
yeah. When you deal with this one then you later on deal with this group and it is also the same 
thing with girls, yeah. And school if you do any, we have like human rights clubs or any kind 
of awareness raising are involving the youth and students, the girl children don’t, they don’t say 
anything, you know they would be in the backgrounds. (Local CSO 2011)
Can decoupling be resolved?
The empirical evidence drawn from the interviews with CSOs in Liberia suggests that 
decoupling, because of lack of resources and willingness, is prevalent and often the dif-
ferent types are intertwined. In an empirical context the different types of decoupling 
require diversified forms of intervention and indicate the need to theorize about different 
mechanisms through which peacebuilding falters. Not all mechanisms have similar 
effects. Low capacity among CSOs (resource decoupling) can be addressed with targeted 
financial and technical support. The distribution of funds also depends on external actors 
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developing effective methods of meaningfully evaluating the impact of different projects 
on peacebuilding. The challenge of satisfying two competing audiences often thwarts 
attempts to address resource decoupling. External actors must satisfy donors, who expect 
results for the resources that they spend, and local communities who expect tangible 
improvements in their quality of life and environment. Often external actors follow ritu-
als that are aimed at displaying the benefits of their actions more to donors than to locals 
(Autesserre, 2014: 215). Decoupling makes it difficult to find common ground between 
the two competing audiences. This leads to frequent failures, even when intervenors 
make efforts to understand and engage with local conditions. This is more than just a 
clash or conflict of interests among actors: it is structurally driven. This reality raises 
multiple questions on how best to resolve such a conundrum.
A small first step is trying to provide a more accurate assessment of the capabilities of 
local organizations based on a set of context-specific criteria, including the age of the 
organization, whether they have built or maintained a centre, their ability to reach remote 
areas and access to other women’s groups. This accompanies more subjective evalua-
tions of the ability of the CSOs’ leaders to comment on the broader social and economic 
context and how broad the CSO’s goals are, for example whether limited to agriculture 
or a genuine interest in peacebuilding activities, broader development and women’s 
rights, can also help to construct a clearer profile of the overall capacity of CSOs.
It is instructive that some UN officials, while they do not use the concept of decou-
pling, recognize the gap between international norms and the implementation of these 
norms in post-conflict reconstruction. In their efforts to address decoupling, they often 
use policies that can be examples of good practice, as the following quote illustrates:
So yes so far I’ve worked with only women groups who established, will have at least a 
structure who have a leadership and I know, have a history of working with other organizations 
and they are honest and they are not eating the money which in Liberian terms means that you 
like misused the funds. (Local CSO Monrovia 2011)
Once capacity has been assessed then meaningful collaborative projects that corre-
spond to local needs in the area can begin. Projects typically require some form of incre-
mental input from external organizations in order to gradually expand their capacity. 
Sometimes established organizations from the ‘local centre’ – for instance, Monrovia – 
that have a history of collaborating with external actors can travel or expand to areas with 
lower capacity and help mobilize local populations. Thus, they can act as intermediaries 
between external actors and smaller, weaker CSOs.
There is perhaps more opportunity for this today, since grand-scale liberal ambitions 
have been scaled back for more pragmatic approaches. Richmond, for instance, talks of 
the emergence of a post-liberal peace based on greater adaptation to the local context and 
the realization that the local agency may well be hostile to and disruptive of external 
intervention (Richmond, 2011: 25). Taking this argument a step further, we suggest that 
international actors actually encourage a change in approach, not only because they are 
starting to recognize the real limits to their actions, but because the ideas underpinning 
international intervention are evolving to concentrate on ‘best fit’ solutions that work 
with existing resources. The most obvious example of this is resilience-building, which 
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can be said to represent a more pragmatic and pre-emptive approach focused more on 
communities and human capacities rather than formal institutions. While some of the 
literature sees this shift as evidence of an intensification of neoliberal solutions, it can 
also be regarded as offering new opportunities for local agency to find space for hybrid 
solutions that reject the classical liberal form (for a discussion of hybridity and resil-
ience, see Chandler and Richmond, 2015).
Normative decoupling requires different strategies of engaging with local actors who 
maintain antithetical values and belief systems to the international norms (Goodman and 
Jinks, 2008). Richmond (2009, 2011) and Mac Ginty (2010) have suggested solutions 
that combine liberal and local into a hybrid form that does not try to replace the liberal 
international approach, but tries to open it up to non-liberal ‘others’. In an active way it 
would try to engineer a negotiation or interface between the everyday local and the inter-
national, to modify how the peacebuilding framework operates (Richmond, 2009: 332). 
Such an approach would be based on negotiation and engagement rather than imposing 
an already decided agenda. This proactive stance could be applied to the different dynam-
ics of decoupling as they emerge in post-conflict countries and potentially lead to poli-
cies that support recoupling or convergence of practices and policies.
However, this does open up a debate over the nature of the hybridity approach. Millar 
(2014) distinguishes between a descriptive approach that tries to understand the main 
processes and a prescriptive approach that seeks to find solutions. Indeed, some critics 
suggest that prescriptive hybridity seeks to patch up the liberal peace, dealing with alter-
ity and context, in a problem solving way (Nadarajah and Rampton, 2014: 58). In the 
case of our decoupling argument, the ‘prescriptive’ implications of the previous section 
may or may not be developed. Identifying decoupling naturally leads to suggestions for 
how to remedy deficiencies and address gaps in implementation. However, like Millar, 
we are more concerned in this article to provide an account of the mechanisms of interac-
tion between international and local actors and to identify the context within which this 
takes place, rather than give in any detail either a prescriptive account of what needs to 
be done, or a more critical account of the rights and wrongs of intervention. Ours is an 
account of decoupling processes, even if prescriptive or critical arguments may follow.
Conclusions
Gender politics in Liberia is one of the issues that should stand a chance of success given 
the history of women’s organizations and movements in the country. Yet, we observe a 
gap between international resolutions and programmes when engaging with local people. 
We use the notion of decoupling to explain the general issue of the gap between formal 
policies and actual practices and outline variants of decoupling to account for such things 
as the limits of institutional designs, gaps between policy and local capacity, and reasons 
for local failure to comply with or to enact global norms.
While the enactment of a global governance agenda can in part be attributed to the 
institutional convergence that often occurs independently of actual external impositions, 
the problems generated by the ensuing processes of normative and resource decoupling 
are compounded by the attitude of external interventions, which tend to use the bottom-
up approach in an instrumental way. A mix of top-down and bottom-up often fails, 
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because it is too much driven by an inflexible element of ‘external engineering’ rather 
than local adaptation. Some, like Krause and Tersonke (2005: 451), argue that the new 
‘hybrid’ approach represents a bolder attempt at externally driven social engineering that 
tries to substitute for a more organic process driven by local actors. It assumes that inter-
national actors can apply the right ‘recipe’ with appropriate adaptation to local condi-
tions. However, we add to this analysis our view that decoupling can also occur because 
of less coercive or instrumental facts relating to institutional imitation. ‘Hybrid’ 
approaches will benefit from understanding the different typologies of decoupling (e.g. 
normative versus resourced decoupling) in order to identify possible areas were syner-
gies can be built and recoupling can develop. Thus, while we have largely outlined the 
negative consequences of decoupling, we do believe that decoupling might take a more 
positive form and create space for a hybrid or post-liberal approach that can better 
address genuine local needs.
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